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Trial Tactics

Reading Transcripts
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

W

hen lawyers introduce transcripts into evidence, how can they make the contents
clear, memorable, and persuasive to jurors?
Do some approaches impermissibly “vouch” for the
contents? These two questions can be addressed and
answered in the context of a case in which the defendant complained about the procedure utilized by the
prosecution to highlight for a jury the contents of
transcribed chat-room conversations.

United States v. Tragas: The Facts

The government brought numerous charges against
Joanne Tragas as a result of her participation in an
international credit and debit card fraud conspiracy.
The case is reported at 727 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2013).
Tragas acted as a middleman between suppliers of
stolen credit and debit card information who were
overseas and street-level users of that information in
the United States. Her overseas suppliers obtained
and sold to her information typically encoded in the
magnetic strip on the back of credit and debit cards.
The transactions were accomplished using international wire transfers. Tragas would take the stolen
data and resell it to her coconspirators in the United
States. Her customers used machines to encode the
information obtained from Tragas on magnetic
strips on blank plastic cards, which were then used
as credit cards, gift cards, and hotel key cards. Once
encoded, the counterfeit cards contained the very
same information found on the legitimate cards.
Tragas’s customers could and did use the fraudulent cards to purchase virtually whatever they
wanted. They bought gift cards and high-end electronics, and they used the cards to get cash.
Two of Tragas’s best customers were twin brothers, Dion and Dionte Hunter. They bought the
stolen information from Tragas and either used it
themselves or sold it to others. The investigation into
the conspiracy revealed that the Hunters paid Tragas
in several different ways: depositing money into her
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bank account, making wire transfers, and permitting
her to use genuine gift cards that had been purchased
through the use of the stolen credit card data that
Tragas provided. Tragas never actually met in person
with the Hunters, but they communicated frequently
using online chat services and instant messaging.
The Hunters kept records of these chat conversations stored on their laptop computer, and police
discovered the messages in a search of the laptop.
The parties to the chat conversations did not use
names, but the defendant’s picture was the “profile
picture” associated with the instant message account
holder who supplied the stolen information to the
Hunters. The prosecution also had evidence that
Tragas used the information supplied in chat conversations to make gift card purchases.
Tragas was convicted on every charge brought
by the government: one count of conspiracy, seven
counts of aiding and abetting unlawful activity under
the Travel Act, one count of bank fraud, and two
counts of wire fraud. The court of appeals affirmed
her conviction but remanded for resentencing.

Reading the Transcripts

The government introduced transcripts of the chat
conversations at trial. Once introduced, the prosecutor and a Secret Service agent read many of the
conversations aloud to the jury. The prosecutor read
aloud the statements attributable to Tragas, and the
case agent read aloud the statements attributable to
her coconspirators. At first, Tragas’s counsel did not
object. But after several conversations were read,
defense counsel objected on the ground that reading
the transcripts aloud was cumulative, as the transcripts themselves were already in evidence.
On appeal, Tragas argued that the reading of
the transcripts denied her a fair trial. The court
of appeals found it difficult to pin down the exact
nature of her argument, but addressed several points
on which the argument seemed to rest.
Hearsay. Tragas appeared to accept that there was
no hearsay problem with the transcripts. Her statements were admissible against her under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), and the coconspirators’
statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
Theatrical performance. Tragas argued that by
reading the transcripts aloud, the prosecutor and
the case agent conducted a “theatrical performance”
that was akin to a reenactment of the chat conversations. She maintained that as a result of this
performance, the prosecution portrayed her written
communications in a way that “telegraphed” to the
jury that she was guilty.
The court responded that it could find no authority for the proposition that reading aloud previously
admitted documentary evidence is either improper
or prejudicial. It cited two cases permitting the
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practice: Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487
U.S. 250, 262–63 (1988) (finding no unfair prejudice where two IRS agents read in tandem from a
transcript before a grand jury); and United States
v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 456–57 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding no unfair prejudice where a police officer
read portions of a defendant’s previously admitted diary to the jury). The court rejected the notion
that simply reading aloud what was contained in a
writing amounted to an improper reenactment and
concluded that reading properly admitted evidence
to a jury was not unfairly prejudicial.
The court recognized that a problem could arise if
a prosecutor attempted to stage a performance that
strayed from the direct evidence introduced at trial
or reflected the prosecutor’s opinions rather than
the evidence. It found, however, that the prosecutor and case agent attempted to read the transcripts
accurately and that the minor discrepancies between
what was read aloud and the transcripts were immaterial, especially in light of the fact that the jury had
copies of the transcripts with which to follow along.
At one point, the court stated it appeared that
Tragas’s principal argument, made in a variety of
ways, was that merely by reading words aloud, the
prosecutor and case agent “imbue[d] the evidence
with some sort of magical power.” (Tragas, 727 F.3d
at 615.) The court was unimpressed by the argument
or Tragas’s assertion that the prosecutor and case
agent engaged in a remarkable departure from traditional American practice.
Improper summary. Tragas argued that reading
the transcripts aloud amounted to an impermissible overview or summary of the government’s case.
The court responded that, while a defendant may
be prejudiced if a law enforcement officer is able
to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence as
an overview at the outset of a trial, the transcripts
were admissible evidence, and neither the prosecutor
nor the case agent appeared to summarize anything.
They simply read the contents of properly admitted documents.
Improper vouching. Tragas argued that the prosecutor’s reading of the chat conversations constituted
improper vouching, which occurs when a prosecutor
improperly indicates a personal belief in the credibility of a witness and thereby places the prestige
of the United States behind the witness. The court
responded by pointing out that Tragas could not
identify any comments or statements that could
be construed as improper vouching or bolstering.
Although the court did not make the point, it seems
that the improper vouching argument was particularly inapt to the extent that the prosecutor was
simply reading Tragas’s own statements. It is difficult
to comprehend the complaint that the prosecutor
was vouching for Tragas.

Confrontation violation. Tragas finally argued
that, because the prosecutor is not a witness and
cannot be cross-examined, any opinions, testimony,
or interpretations of evidence by the prosecutor
are barred by the Sixth Amendment confrontation
clause. Once again, the court declined to equate
reading the transcripts with offering opinions or
testimony and concluded that there was no confrontation problem.

Was There a Problem?

Is there something that courts should be concerned
about in the way the prosecutor chose to present the
chat conversation evidence to the jury in Tragas?
The correct answer is a resounding “no,” and the
reasons for this should be clear.
First, it is not unusual for lawyers to read the
contents of documents to jurors. Lawyers do that
all the time. In civil cases, they highlight words in
contracts—sometimes by blowing them up so that
they receive special emphasis, sometimes by reading them aloud for emphasis, and at other times by
doing both for extra emphasis. Lawyers frequently
read e-mails aloud in both civil and criminal cases.
Thus, an argument that it is improperly “theatrical”
to read the contents of documents flies in the face
of well-established practice.
Second, it is imperative that lawyers highlight
the portions of documents upon which they want
jurors to focus. This is necessary to ensure that jurors
appreciate why documents have been put into evidence, and that they have an adequate opportunity
to become familiar with the contents. Few lawyers
are content to simply offer documents into evidence
with the hope or the assumption that the jury will
read them at some time during the trial or deliberations. Some judges don’t send all exhibits into
the jury room during deliberations, and, unless the
contents of documents are called to the jury’s attention when they are introduced, the jury may never
see the contents. Even if documents are sent to the
jury room, there is no assurance that all jurors will
read them. In short, lawyers have a right and a need
to put the contents of documents before the jury in
a way that ensures that the jury comprehends the
contents and is focused on the portions that counsel believe are most significant.
Third, there is nothing in the law of evidence or in
procedural rules that requires that only one person
read from a document. It is not uncommon in civil
cases for a lawyer and an assistant to read deposition
testimony by having one person read the questions
and another person read the answers. This actually highlights for a jury when a question or answer
begins and ends. There is no reason why in a criminal case having a prosecutor and case agent do the
same should be deemed prejudicial. The jury was
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better able to follow the conversation and to distinguish Tragas’s statements from others’ with two
people reading the statements than if the prosecutor alone read everything. That said, there might be
a problem if a prosecutor were to choose another
reader who might have a special impact on a jury.
Though unlikely to occur, if a prosecutor were to
have a famous actor, a former president, a popular
elected official, or a respected religious leader join
in reading aloud a transcript, a court might believe
that the prosecutor was seeking an unfair advantage.
This was not the case in Tragas.
Fourth, there is no restriction on a prosecutor or
a defense counsel reading a document in a way that
emphasizes certain words. The jury will see the document as well as hear the reading, and can decide for
itself whether the document was read in a fair manner. Moreover, despite Tragas’s attempts to prevent
a prosecutor from “interpreting” evidence, prosecutors and defense lawyers do this in every case as part
of closing argument. They ask the jury to accept
their view of what evidence actually means. Thus,
a prosecutor may tell the jury in closing that “we
submit the defendant’s statement . . . meant that
the defendant was agreeing to buy stolen credit card
information,” while defense counsel may argue to
the contrary that “we submit the defendant’s statement had nothing to do with credit cards, stolen or

legitimate.” It is permissible for both prosecutor and
defense counsel to read during closing argument
portions of admitted documents and to argue the
meaning of what they read.
Fifth, far from being unfair, the reading of a document by a prosecutor alone or by a prosecutor
assisted by a case agent does something important
for the defense: namely, it ensures that defense counsel and the defendant know what has been read and
what has been emphasized so that the defense is in
a position to respond—by its own reading of documents or in closing argument. While jurors may
read documents on their own and focus on parts
not called to their attention by counsel, it is unlikely
that jurors will pay more attention to the parts that
have been ignored by the lawyers than to parts that
have been emphasized.
Finally, there is nothing wrong with prosecutors and defense counsel working to keep jurors
interested in the presentation of evidence. Having
a prosecutor or a defense counsel read a document
to a jury in a monotone with no emphasis is likely
to result in boredom or juror inattention or both.
Having two people participate in reading a document as in Tragas may do much to keep the jurors
interested and attentive. That is to be applauded
rather than condemned. n
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